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Abstract
Membership inference (MI) in machine learning decides whether a given example is
in target model’s training set. It can be used in two ways: adversaries use it to steal
private membership information while legitimate users can use it to verify whether
their data has been forgotten by a trained model. Therefore, MI is a double-edged
sword to privacy preserving machine learning. In this paper, we propose using
private augmented data to sharpen its good side while passivate its bad side. To
sharpen the good side, we exploit the data augmentation used in training to boost the
accuracy of membership inference. Specifically, we compose a set of augmented
instances for each sample and then the membership inference is formulated as a
set classification problem, i.e., classifying a set of augmented data points instead
of one point. We design permutation invariant features based on the losses of
augmented instances. Our approach significantly improves the MI accuracy over
existing algorithms. To passivate the bad side, we apply different data augmentation
methods to each legitimate user and keep the augmented data as secret. We show
that the malicious adversaries cannot benefit from our algorithms if being ignorant
of the augmented data used in training. Extensive experiments demonstrate the
superior efficacy of our algorithms. Our source code is available at anonymous
GitHub page https://github.com/AnonymousDLMA/MI_with_DA.
1 Introduction
Membership inference (MI) against machine learning models has been extensively studied from
the adversary perspective [21, 26, 19, 16, 15, 12, 23]. An adversary applies membership inference
algorithms to steal privacy-sensitive membership information from target model’s training data [4, 17].
One example is that participation in a disease-specific dataset indicates the diagnosis of such disease
[4]. Hence from the view of legitimate users and machine learning service providers, it is desirable to
suppress such attack as much as possible, i.e., diminishing the MI success rate of the adversary.
On the other side, we advocate that membership inference can enable the legitimate users to better
control their data, e.g., to infer whether a service provider uses their data to train a public model. In
machine learning context, the influence of a user on trained model should be erased at request as the
learned model leaks private information about its training data [6, 25, 21, 11, 29]. This aligns with
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the spirit of “the right to be forgotten” in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [2] and the California Consumer Privacy Act in the United States [1]. In Section 4, we show
that membership inference can be used to verify the compliance of data deletion in machine learning
(also known as machine unlearning), which has attracted lots of attention over the years [7, 5, 9].
We argue that this ability benefits not only the users but also the machine learning service providers
because it has been observed that applications with good privacy protection promote user adoption
[3]. In this case, it is desirable to enhance the MI success rate for the legitimate users.
It seems that we cannot achieve these two goals simultaneously because of the contradictory objectives.
In this paper, however, we propose leveraging private data augmentation as a solution. We first show
one can utilize the data augmentation used in training to boost MI success rate. Then we show
legitimate users can protect membership privacy by applying data augmentation secretly.
The core technique for boosting MI success rate is to utilize the set of augmented data points instead
of one data point to do membership inference. Specifically, with a set of predictions of augmented
data points, we formulate the membership inference as a set classification problem. We then design
classifiers based on permutation invariant features: one using threshold on some basic statistics
of losses, and the other training a neural network with the moments of losses. Our algorithms
significantly improve the success rate over existing membership inference algorithms when the same
augmented data points are used in training process. Moreover, without the knowledge about the
augmented data used in training, our algorithms have no improvement over existing algorithms.
Therefore, we argue that the adversary cannot take advantage of our algorithms if the augmented data
is kept as secret by the legitimate user.
In this paper, we focus on the black-box membership inference [21, 26, 19, 23, 18]. The black-box
setting naturally arises in the machine learning as a service (MLaaS) system. In MLaaS, a service
provider trains a ML model on private crowdsourced data and releases the model to users through
prediction API. Under the black-box setting, one has access to the model’s output of a given example.
Typical outputs are the loss value [26, 18] and the predicted logits of all classes [21, 19]. In this paper,
we use the loss value of a given example as suggested in [18].
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. We design new membership inference algorithms
against machine learning models and achieve significantly higher inference accuracy than existing
algorithms. We also demonstrate that the adversary can not take advantage of our algorithms if the
augmented data used in training is kept as secret. Furthermore, we compose a set of membership
inference results over a given dataset to verify the compliance of deleting the given dataset from
trained model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to explore such usage of membership
inference. Our verification process is easy to implement and achieves high confidence based on our
strong MI routine.
1.1 Related work
Existing implementations of membership inference include those based on neural network and those
based on simple metrics. Shokri et al. [21] and Salem et al. [19] train a neural network to infer the
membership of a given example with multiple shadow models generating training data. Song et al.
[23] use a threshold on the prediction confidence to determine if an example is a member or not.
Yeom et al. [26] and Sablayrolles et al. [18] classify one sample in the training set if the loss of the
sample is lower than a predefined threshold. All existing attacks only use the target model’s output
on single example even when data augmentation is used.
In machine learning context, “the right to be forgotten” requires to remove the influence of given
examples from a trained model [7, 5, 9]. Ginart et al. [7] construct quantized and divide-and-conquer
k-means clustering algorithms to avoid retraining the model from scratch. Bourtoule et al. [5] divide
the dataset into multiple shards, train sub models on each shard, and only retrain the sub model that
is affected by deleting request. Guo et al. [9] focus on linear models, where they use second order
update to cancel out target example’s influence and then add noise to achieve certified removal.
Apart from designing provable algorithm that can perform data deletion from a trained model, it is
also considered how to verify the compliance of requested deletion. Sommer et al. [22] use backdoor
attack [14, 8] to verify whether a server deletes given data faithfully. They force the model to
memorize the specific trigger of each user, which requires quite a number of intentionally poisoned
examples to succeed. This decreases the model’s test performance. In contrast, we use membership
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inference as basic oracle, which neither requires individual user has large dataset nor hurts the target
model’s test performance.
1.2 Paper organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some background knowledge.
We present two new membership inference algorithms in Section 3 and show that the malicious
adversary cannot take advantage of them. Section 4 introduces how to use membership inference
to verify the compliance of machine unlearning. Section 5 presents experiment results on different
models and datasets. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminary
We useD = {(x1, y1), . . . (xn, yn)} to denote a dataset with n pairs of feature and label. The dataset
may be constructed from a set of users U = {u1, . . . , uk}. The crowdsourced dataset D = ∪Di is
the union of all users’ datasets. A trained model f(x; θ) : X → Y with parameters θ is a mapping
from the feature space to the label space. Given model’s prediction and target label, the loss function
l computes the loss value, e.g. the cross-entroy loss for classification problem. We use f(x) to denote
f(x; θ) if without further explanation.
Data augmentation generates similar variants for each example to enlarge the training set. We use
T to denote the set of all possible transformations. For given (x, y), each transformation function
t ∈ T generates one augmented example t(x, y). For example, if data is image, each t could be the
combination of rotation and random cropping. The set T then contains the transformations with all
possible rotation degrees and cropping locations. The size of T may be unlimited and we are only
able to use a subset in practice. We use T ⊂ T to denote a subset with N transformation instances.
We adjust N to control the strength of data augmentation.
Let M be a membership inference algorithm against a trained model f . The output of M is a boolean
value denotes whether a given example is in the training set of f . For example, the algorithm based
on loss threshold [26, 18] can be formulated as
Mloss(x, y, f) = True if l(f(x), y) < τloss,
where τloss is a predefined scalar threshold. Song et al. [23] use prediction confidence to infer the
membership. They classify an example as member if the output confidence is higher than a predefined
scalar threshold:
Mconf (x, y, f) = True if f(x)y > τprob.
3 Membership Inference with Data Augmentation
In this section, we first show why existing algorithms perform badly when the target model is trained
with data augmentation. Then we present our new MI algorithms which can exploit the information
of a set of augmented instances rather than a single example. Finally, we show the adversary cannot
take advantage of the proposed algorithms if the augmentation used in training is kept secret to the
adversary.
3.1 On the limitation of existing MI algorithms
The success of existing MI algorithms largely depends on the generalization gap of target model.
Generalization gap measures how differently the target model perform on the training set and the
test set. Therefore, MI is easy to do if the generalization gap is large. For example, Shokri et al. [21]
achieve inference success rate higher than 70% against a model trained on CIFAR10 [13] dataset
while the gap between target model’s training and test accuracy is nearly 40%. They show the
inference accuracy drops quickly as the target model’s generalization gap diminishes (Table 2 in
[21]).
It is has been observed that that data augmentation, a powerful weapon to combat overfitting, can
significantly reduces the success rate of existing MI algorithms [18]. In order to clearly illustrate the
influence of data augmentation, we plot the distribution of losses in Figure 1. We use the ResNet110
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Figure 1: Loss distribution from models trained with/without data augmentation on CIFAR10 dataset.
The model is ResNet110. The plot uses 10000 examples from training set and 10000 examples from
test set. The overlap area (dark region) between training and test distributions is significantly larger
when data augmentation is used.
model [10] to fit CIFAR10 dataset [13]. We use the same transformation pool T as the one in [10]
which contains horizontal flipping and random cropping. The size of T is N = 10. As shown in
Figure 1, the overlap area between losses of training examples and losses of test examples is much
larger when data augmentation is used. For the loss inside the overlap area, it is impossible to classify
its membership confidently. The overlap area sets up a ceiling on the membership inference success
rates for the MI algorithms which use single loss value as feature.
3.2 New membership inference algorithms
As the existing MI algorithms are inherently limited by the large overlap area in Figure 1, we
propose leveraging more information from data augmentation to boost the MI success rate. With data
augmentation, the model is trained with a set of augmented data points T (x, y) = {(t(x), y); t ∈
T}. Consequently, we have a set of outputs based on T (x, y) and a set of losses LT,f (x, y) =
{lf (x˜, y); (x˜, y) ∈ T (x, y)}. We hide T and f for readability when there is no ambiguity. Instead
of using single loss as in [18], we use L(x, y) to do the membership inference. The inference task
is then to classify L(x, y) into either training or test set. For each (x, y) ∈ D, L(x, y) is a valid
empirical distribution. We plot the distributions of the basic statistics of L(x, y) in Figure 2. The
overlap area in Figure 2 is smaller compared to Figure 1 because L(x, y) contains more information
than single loss value.
Figure 2: Distributions of mean and standard deviation of L(x, y). The experiment setting is the
same as Figure 1. When using mean or standard deviation of L(x, y) as metric, the overlap area
between training and test distributions is smaller than using single loss.
Smaller overlap area indicates that it is easier to distinguish examples from training and test sets.
Therefore, the results in Figure 2 suggest that using the basic statistics of L(x, y) is better than using
single loss. Motivated by this, we first explore using the mean or standard deviation of L(x, y) as
input feature for set classification.
Following previous threshold based algorithms [18, 23], the threshold τ in Algorithm 1 can either be
tuned as hyperparameter or set based on the outputs of shadow models. From Table 1, we can see
that Algorithm 1 outperforms existing algorithms by a large margin.
As mean and standard deviation are only coarse information of L(x, y), it is natural to ask if we
can design features incorporating the most information of L(x, y). A straightforward solution is to
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Algorithm 1: Membership inference based on basic statistics of L(x, y) (Mmean, Mstd).
Input : losses of target example L(x, y); threshold τ ; metric function m computes mean or
standard deviation.
Output :boolean value, true denotes (x, y) is a member.
1 Compute v = m(L(x, y)).
2 Return v < τ .
train a neural network which takes entire L(x, y) as input and outputs final decision. However, such
straightforward solution performs badly, whose experiment results are relegated to Appendix. One
reason is that using losses as input is not invariant to permutation on losses . As a set classification
problem, the order of elements in L(x, y) should not change the final decision [28]. Using raw losses
as input does not possess this property because permuting the input losses will change the outputs of
neurons. This makes the inference model hard to distinguish what is useful feature for classification
and what is the noise induced by the different positions of losses.
In order to design features which are invariant to permutation on losses, we use the raw moments of
L(x, y). The ith raw moment vi of a probability density (mass) function p(z) can be computed as
vi =
∫ +∞
−∞
zip(z)dz.
The moments of L(x, y) can be computed easily because it is a valid empirical distribution with
uniform probability mass. For probability distributions in bounded intervals, the moments of all orders
uniquely determines the distribution (known as Hausdorff moment problem [20]). More importantly,
shuffling the elements in L(x, y) would not change the resulting moments. In Algorithm 2, we use
the raw moments as features and train a neural network to infer the membership.
Algorithm 2: Membership inference based on moments of L(x, y) (Mmoments).
Input : losses of target example Ltarget(x, y); losses from training and test sets
Ltrain = {L(x, y); (x, y) ∈ Dtrain}, Ltest = {L(x, y); (x, y) /∈ Dtrain}; maximum
moments order m; specification of inference network S.
Output :boolean value, true denotes (x, y) is a member.
1 for L(x, y) ∈ Ltrain ∪ Ltest do
2 for i ∈ [m] do
3 Compute the ith raw moment of L(x, y): vi = 1|T |
∑
l∈L(x,y) l
i.
4 Normalize vi = v
1
i
i
5 end
6 Create tuple (v = {vi; i ∈ [m]}, in), where in = 1L(x,y)∈Ltrain .
7 end
8 Use created tuples and specification S to train the inference model N .
9 Return N(Ltarget(x, y))
The training data of Algorithm 2 can be collected by using shadow models [21] or by assuming the
prior knowledge on part of the target model’s training data [16]. We find that the training of inference
network in Algorithm 2 only needs several hundreds of training points, which is much fewer than
previous algorithms based on neural net, e.g. Shokri et al. [21] need thousands of training points to
train the inference model. This is because the moments of losses are features easier to fit than the
output logits in [21].
To demonstrate the effectiveness of Algorithm 1 and 2, we evaluate them on both the small convolution
model in the membership inference literature [21, 18] and standard ResNet [10]. We benchmark
our algorithms with Mloss and Mconf . For baselines, we report the best result among using each
l ∈ L(x, y) and the loss of original image. We do not use the loss of original image for our
algorithms. We use the benchmark dataset CIFAR10, which has 10 classes of real-world objects. We
use 6 common operations to construct T , including rotation, translations, random erasing, etc. The
details are introduced in Appendix. We sample a subset T ⊂ T with N = 10. Other implementation
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Table 1: Membership inference success rates (in %) on CIFAR10 dataset. The number under
membership inference algorithm is the inference accuracy. We use bold font to denote the best
inference accuracy. The baseline attacks Mloss and Mconf are introduced in Section 2. The row
with N = 0 denotes model trained without data augmentation. Test acc. denotes the target model’s
classification accuracy on test set.
Model |T | Test acc. Mloss Mconf Mmean Mstd Mmoments
2-layer ConvNet
N = 0 59.7 83.7 83.4 N/A N/A N/A
N = 3 64.6 82.2 82.1 90.3 90.9 91.3
N = 10 66.8 63.5 63.5 69.4 71.6 71.4
ResNet110
N = 0 84.9 65.4 65.3 N/A N/A N/A
N = 3 89.4 63.2 63.2 68.5 68.7 71.4
N = 10 92.7 59.3 58.7 66.3 66.9 67.1
Table 2: Membership inference success rates (in %) with partial or no knowledge on augmented data
used in training. We train the ResNet110 model on CIFAR10 dataset with N = 10. The numbers
(N ′) in first row denote the number of transformations in T the adversary has access to. When
N ′ = 0, we random sample T ′ ∈ T with |T ′| = 10 to evaluate our algorithms.
N ′ 10 8 6 4 2 0
Mmoments 67.1 66.5 65.4 63.5 61.6 55.7
Mstd 66.9 66.0 65.8 64.3 61.4 54.5
details are the same as those used in Section 5. The results are presented Table 1. For a given strength
of augmentation, Algorithm 1 and 2 outperform existing methods significantly. Algorithm 2 has
the best performance in general because it utilizes the most information of L(x, y). Surprisingly,
our algorithms on models trained with data augmentation sometimes perform even better than the
baseline algorithms on models trained without data augmentation. More experiments with varying N
are presented in Section 5.
3.3 Using secret transformations to protect membership privacy
Algorithm 1 and 2 give legitimate users new and better ways to verify their influence in trained
models. Then the question left is how to prevent the adversary takes advantage of our algorithms to
to steal private membership information.
We propose using private data augmentation to suppress the adversary without hurting the inference
accuracy of legitimate users. When T (x, y) is in training set, the elements in L(x, y) are small
because deep neural net can memorize T (x, y). Otherwise, the elements in L(x, y) are usually large.
This contradistinction makes MI a easier task. Therefore, whether T (x, y) is used in training matters.
Legitimate users can utilize this phenomenon to make our attacks only available to themselves.
Specifically, instead of choosing the same T for all users, ui can construct Ti privately. The malicious
attacker can not acquire useful knowledge of Ti by random guessing as long as the used T is large
enough. We record the used transformation set for each user and use it to evaluate our algorithms after
training. This process is similar to set a password. Without the “password” (Ti), the malicious attacker
can only use the original image or randomly chosen transformations which yields significantly lower
inference success rate. In Table 2, we show the inference success rates when the adversary only has
partial or no knowledge on the transformation set used in training. The inference success rate drops
quickly as the adversary’s knowledge on Ti diminishes. We illustrate the above process in Figure 3.
4 Use Membership Inference to Verify Machine Unlearning
In this section, we show membership inference can be used to verify the compliance of machine
learning. We composite the results of membership inference on individual examples in a given set to
infer whether the influence of such set is removed form target model. We use Di and ni to denote
the target dataset and its size, respectively. For every (x, y) in Di, M(x, y) returns 1 if it predicts
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Figure 3: Illustration of using private data augmentation to protect membership privacy. User i first
chooses Ti secretly. Then users train a model jointly by sharing the augmented examples or the
gradients computed on augmented data to service provider A. Service provider A releases the trained
model through black-box API. If service provider B also has ui as its user, it can use the data to probe
the membership of ui in the published model. However, the malicious attacker has no access to Ti
and therefore has low inference success rate.
the example is used in training, otherwise it returns 0. Let c =
∑
(x,y)∈Di M(x, y) be the number of
total positive predictions. Large c indicates that the user’s data is not deleted. Following Sommer
et al. [22], we formulate a hypothesis testing problem. Specifically, we define the null hypothesis as
H0: Di is not in the training set of given model (server removes the influence of Di from model) and
alternative hypothesis as H1: Di is in the training set. There are two types of errors we might make.
The Type I error rate α (false positive) and Type II error rate β (false negative) are
α = Pr[Accepts H1|H0], β = Pr[Accepts H0|H1].
We acceptH0 if c is smaller than a given threshold s otherwise we acceptH1. Let p = Pr[M(x, y) =
0|H0] be the probability that the inference oracle correctly predicts (x, y) not a member of training
set. Let q = Pr[M(x, y) = 1|H1] be the probability that the MI oracle correctly predicts (x, y) a
member. We assume the probabilities are the same and independent for every (x, y) in Di. For a
given threshold s, the probability that we make the Type I error is
α = Pr
 ∑
(x,y)∈Di
M(x, y) ≥ s|H0
 = ni∑
j=s
(
ni
j
)
(1− p)jp(ni−j),
which means that H0 is true but we rejects it because c is large. Analogously, the probability of
making Type II error is
β = Pr
 ∑
(x,y)∈Di
M(x, y) < s|H1
 = s−1∑
j=0
(
ni
j
)
qj(1− q)(ni−j).
The probability p can be estimated by the inference success rate on testing set and the probability q
can be estimated by the inference success rate on training set. For a given tolerance of α, we choose
c to minimize the type II error β. The experimental results are shown in Section 5.2.
5 More Experiments
In this section, we sample a random subset T ∈ T for every example. We first compare our algorithms
with existing inference algorithms. Then we use membership inference to verify the compliance of
machine unlearning.
5.1 Comparison with existing algorithms
We conduct more experiments on both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. CIFAR100 has 100
classes of real world objectives and therefore it is harder than CIFAR10. We also evaluate our
algorithms on the Wide ResNet model [27]. We use the WRN16-8 model, which has more than
7
Figure 4: Membership inference success rates with varyingN . The left y-axis denotes the membership
inference attack success rate. The right y-axis denotes the test accuracy of target model. The advantage
of our algorithms is clear on different datasets and models with varying choices of N .
Table 3: Machine unlearning verification confidence on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. We use
ResNet110 and WRN16-8 with N = 10. Notations: p and q denote the MI oracle’s prediction
accuracy on test and training set, respectively, and ni is the size of target dataset. We set Type I error
α < 1× 10−3. Smaller Type II error β indicates higher confidence.
Data (Model) Attack MI accuracy p q β (ni = 15) β (ni = 30)
CIFAR10 Mloss 58.8% 0.203 0.973 1.0 1.0
(ResNet110) Mmoments 67.1% 0.382 0.960 0.458 0.031
CIFAR100 Mloss 71.9% 0.482 0.956 0.139 1.7× 10−4
(ResNet110) Mmoments 80.2% 0.653 0.951 5.1× 10−4 8.9× 10−8
CIFAR10 Mloss 61.9% 0.253 0.986 1.0 0.35
(WRN16-8) Mmoments 70.1% 0.423 0.978 0.283 4.6×10−4
CIFAR100 Mloss 76.8% 0.560 0.977 4.5× 10−3 2.9× 10−7
(WRN16-8) Mmoments 83.4% 0.688 0.979 1.0× 10−5 4.4× 10−13
10 million parameters. The baseline algorithms are Mloss and Mconf . For baselines, we report the
best result among using every element in L(x, y) and the loss of original image. For all threshold
based algorithms, we tune the thresholds to separate the training and test sets optimally [18, 23]. For
Algorithm 2, we use 200 examples from training set and 200 examples from test set to build the
training data of inference network. The inference network has one hidden layer with 20 neurons and
we compute moments up to 20 orders as input features. We use 2500 examples from the training set
and 2500 examples from the test set to evaluate the inference success rates. The examples used to
evaluate inference accuracy have no overlap with inference model’s training data. All models are
trained on a single Tesla P40 GPU. More details such as training recipes and model configurations
are available in Appendix. We plot the results with varying N in Figure 4. Our algorithms achieve
high inference success rates against well-generalized models. Both Algorithm 1 and 2 outperform
existing algorithms by a large margin on different models and datasets.
5.2 Machine unlearning verification
We use the trained models to verify the proposed verification method. We use the membership
inference success rate on training set to estimate q and the success rate on test set to estimate p. We
use ni to denote the size of target dataset. For given ni and the tolerance of Type I error α, we choose
s to minimize β. The experiment results are shown in Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, our verification mechanism needs smaller ni compared to the verification based
on backdoor attack [22] while still achieves very high confidence. Moreover, our mechanism does
not need to poison the data with wrong label and therefore causes no damage to target model’s test
performance. The target model WRN16-8 in Table 3 achieves 94.6% test accuracy on CIFAR10
dataset. This suggests that membership inference is a powerful and effective way to verify the
compliance of requested data deletion.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose membership inference with private data augmentation, which benefits the
legitimate data owners while suppresses the adversary. For a given example, we use the losses of its
augmented examples to infer its membership. We present two ways: one using the mean and standard
deviation of losses, and the other training a neural network with the moments of losses as permutation
invariant features. The proposed algorithms achieve high membership inference accuracy against
models with good generalization. Moreover, we show that the malicious adversaries can not take
advantage of our algorithms if the benign users apply data augmentation privately.
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Broader Impact
This work benefits the legitimate data owners with new ways to decide their contribution on a trained
ML model without hurting membership privacy. This work also boosts the communication between
the participants working on privacy preserving machine learning and the participants working on state-
of-the-art ML applications by exploring accurate membership inference algorithms against models
with high test accuracy. This work has no explicit ethical concerns and the proposed algorithms do
not leverage biases in data.
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Appendix A Supplementary materials for Section 3
A.1 Details of T
We use 6 standard operations in image processing literature such as rotation, translation, shearing,
etc. The details are listed below.
1. Flip the image horizontally with probability p = 0.5.
2. Padding 32 image into 40× 40 and take a 32× 32 crop at random location.
3. Rotate the image by d ∈ [−15, 15] degrees.
4. Translate the image by d ∈ [−6, 6] pixels.
5. Shear the image by d ∈ [−15, 15] degrees.
6. Erase a 4× 4 box at random location.
For each t ∈ T , the operations are applied with random order and the parameters of each operation
are also randomly chosen. We record the sequence of operations and parameters of each operation to
save a chosen transformation. Then we use the saved transformations to evaluate MI algorithms after
training.
A.2 Using raw outputs as features for inference model
We show that using raw outputs of target model to train inference model yields bad inference
accuracy. We evaluate two approaches: one using the raw losses (Mraw_loss), and the other using the
output logits of all augmented examples plus the ground truth label (Mraw_logits). For example, we
concatenate the outputs of all augmented instances into a one dimension tensor. The pseudocodes of
Mraw_loss and Mraw_logits are shown in Algorithm 3 and 4, respectively. The word ‘specification’
in pseudocode denotes the architecture and hyperparameters of target model. See Appendix B.1 for
details.
Algorithm 3: Membership inference based on raw losses (Mraw_loss).
Input : losses of target example Ltarget(x, y); losses from training and test sets
Ltrain = {L(x, y); (x, y) ∈ Dtrain}, Ltest = {L(x, y); (x, y) /∈ Dtrain}; specification
of inference network S.
Output :boolean value, true denotes (x, y) is a member.
1 for L(x, y) ∈ Ltrain ∪ Ltest do
2 Concatenate the elements in L(x, y) into vector v.
3 Create tuple (v, in), where in = 1L(x,y)∈Ltrain .
4 end
5 Use created tuples and specification S to train the inference model N .
6 Return N(Ltarget(x, y))
We use 200 (2500) examples from training set and 200 (2500) examples from test set to build the
training data for Mraw_loss (Mraw_logits). The configuration of inference model is the same as
Mmoments. The results are shown in Table 4. The results suggest that the raw outputs are less
informative than moments of losses. This may due to the raw outputs are not invariant to permutation
on the augmented instances.
Appendix B Supplementary materials for Section 5
B.1 Implementation details of experiments
The small model used in Section 3 contains two convolution layers with 64 kernels, a global pooling
layer and a fully connected layer of size 128. Following [18, 23], we using 15000 examples as
training set. The model is trained for 200 epochs with initial learning rate 0.01. We decay the learning
rate by 10 at the 100-th epoch. The ResNet110 and WRN16-8 models are adopted from original
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Dataset Model Test acc. Mraw_loss Mraw_logits Mmoments
CIFAR10
ResNet110 92.8 61.8 56.9 67.2
WRN16-8 94.6 63.0 58.3 70.1
CIFAR100
ResNet110 69.9 74.1 51.7 80.2
WRN16-8 76.1 77.2 52.9 83.4
Table 4: Membership inference success rate (in %) on CIFAR10/100 dataset with |T | = N = 10.
The numbers in third column denote the target model’s top1 test accuracy. We use bold font to denote
the best inference accuracy.
Algorithm 4: Membership inference based on raw logits (Mraw_logits).
Input : logits of target example Gtarget(x, y) = {f(x˜, y); (x˜, y) ∈ T (x, y)}; logits from training
and test sets Gtrain = {G(x, y); (x, y) ∈ Dtrain}, Gtest = {G(x, y); (x, y) /∈ Dtrain};
specification of inference network S.
Output :boolean value, true denotes (x, y) is a member.
1 for G(x, y) ∈ Gtrain ∪ Gtest do
2 Concatenate all elements in G(x, y) and label y into vector v.
3 Create tuple (v, in), where in = 1L(x,y)∈Ltrain .
4 end
5 Use created tuples and specification S to train the inference model N .
6 Return N(Gtarget(x, y))
papers and we train the models with the same hyperparameters. For ResNet110 and WRN16-8, we
use 50000 examples as training set and 10000 examples as test set.
We use 200 examples from training set and 200 examples from test set to build the training set for
Mmoments. We use moments up to 20 orders, which yields a 20-dimensional input. The inference
model has one hidden layer with 20 neurons and we use Tanh non-linearity as activation function.
We train the attack network for 1000 steps with learning rate 0.5. To compute the inference success
rate, we use 2500 examples from the training set and 2500 examples from the test set.
B.2 More experiments
In Table 5, we compare our algorithms with two baseline algorithms Mloss and Mconf with N = 10.
We apply different data augmentation to every example. The experiment settings are the same as those
in Section 5. The results in Table 5 further justify the effectiveness of our algorithms. Interestingly,
although the generalization gap of WRN16-8 is smaller than the gap of ResNet110, the algorithms
achieve higher inference accuracy on WRN16-8. This phenomenon aligns with the finding in Tonni
et al. [24] that the inference accuracy is affected not only by the generalization gap but also by the
model and dataset in use.
Dataset Model Test acc. Mloss Mconf Mmean Mstd Mmoments
CIFAR10
ResNet110 92.8 59.3 59.2 66.3 67.0 67.2
WRN16-8 94.6 61.9 61.9 67.2 68.8 70.1
CIFAR100
ResNet110 69.9 71.9 71.8 79.2 79.9 80.2
WRN16-8 76.1 76.9 76.8 81.9 82.9 83.4
Table 5: Membership inference success rate (in %) on CIFAR10/100 dataset with N = 10. The
numbers in third column denote the target model’s top1 validation accuracy. The baseline algorithms
Mloss and Mconf are introduced in Section 2. We use bold font to denote the best inference accuracy.
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